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i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintifif7Appellee, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20040901-CA 
JOE SUNTfflPHAB BOUPHA, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conditional plea under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), to Possession of a Controlled Substance with intent to 
distribute, a second-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(1 )(aXiii). 
The Defendant was sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of one to 
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID TROOPER JONES HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
CONTINUE THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST AFTER THE 
CAR'S OWNER ADMITTED THAT THE MARIJUANA AND 
PARAPHERNALIA FOUND IN THE CENTER CONSOLE 
WERE HIS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a search and seizure case. 
Whether a set of facts gives rise to probable cause is a determination of law 
should be reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. See, State v. Hodson, 
907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah Ct App. 1995). Since it is a mixed question of fact 
and law some measure of discretion should be afforded to the trial court's 
application of the law. See, State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
However, the measure of discretion afforded varies according to the issue 
being reviewed. "When a case involves the reasonableness of a search and 
seizure, we afford little discretion to the district court because there must be 
state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials." 
State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003). Furthermore, the trial court's 
factual findings should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of 
review. State v. Brake, 103 P.3d 699 (Utah 2004). This issue was preserved 
when Defendant's attorney filed a motion to suppress and a memorandum in 
support thereof (R. 044-55), and when he held a suppression hearing 
challenging the search. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATE CONSTITUTION 
FOURTH AMENDMENT- The right of the people to be secure in then-
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
2 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 58-37-2(lXdd) - Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
•; (dd) "Person" means any corporation, assoehiiioII |t.irinoiship I rust, other 
institution or entity or one or more individual 
SECTION 58-37-8(lXaXiii) - ttrohibitnl at" ; - Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(ill) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent t^r 
SECTION 78-2a-3(2Xe> Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,,,., including JUJ * vi I • ( i n n 
of interlocutory appeals, over 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was gorged b} * formation with possession ^ * 
controlled ^aby..:--i- "^ * l >A ^ .,Minute Q ^ecfiu ik'[ v, 
/possession of marijuana and parapherna nusdniK'^ - HK, 
*—~ ~iisdemeano ^a bargain.
 v.~ y 
> .^. . -press the c.idc
 VR 044-55). The State 
filed an objection to Defendant's motion to suppre > (R. 064-691 i lioi ing 
was held on J~i) "J, ^ •' 13, 2004 :- rnmt o^the Honorable Hurley Is Haldwin 
Following the htdi^ «L *Y~ —^ ~ourt wViui .: , >c...2uaiii ' nolin i I1 i r l 
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The State was asked to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
(R. 105-07). 
On August 5, 2004, the Defendant entered into a plea bargain with the 
State. He pled guilty to the possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, a second-degree felony, District Court Case No. 031903714, which 
is the case currently on appeal. He also pled guilty to a third degree felony, 
possession of a controlled substance, District Court Case No. 041900894. Case 
number 041900894 is unrelated and has not been appealed. 
The plea to case number 031903714, was entered pursuant to State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). (R. 100). The Defendant was 
sentenced on September 16, 2004 to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah 
State Prison. (R. 109). The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed 
on the same day. (R. 100-01). A Notice of Appeal was filed on October 18, 
2004. (R. 112). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 22, 2003, Trooper Chris Jones of the Utah Highway Patrol 
initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle for speeding and a window tint violation. 
The Defendant was a passenger in the vehicle (R. 134/9-10). Trooper Jones 
arrested the driver of the vehicle, Adam Neusocksi, ("Neusocksi") for DUI. 
(R. 134/11). Neusocksi, was also the owner of the vehicle. (R. 134/18). After 
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Neusonksi vv.is, iirirunl the vehicle was searched. (R. 134/18), While the 
trooper was searching what he called "the passenger compartment i* MI. .J a 
marijuana pipe and a small prescription bottle, which containea marijua », 
134/191? Tbis "passenger ~~mpartmeri( was lata irlenvd 
console/ -. . . II 
i sr;K-hi"g tiiw vehicle, the Defendant was 
ith two other officers. (R. 134/24, 75N A *~r -he 
trooper found the marijuana he asked the driver and v . dendant wnoi 3 
marijuana belonged (. m ^4/24). Both the dnvei ol ihi" heieiulan1 denied 
knowing about the marijuana uthough ed ownership 
of the marijuana, he L . me Defendant admitted 'that 
lit; VI uM*il manpun * within *- ibt iour days and methamphetam.ine within the 
l.i's'i 1 \A/OD1\-four hours, ^v, 134/25). 
Trooper Jones is a drug recognition expert - .r 
that 'the Defendant had "reddening of the .<**:. . 
that the Defendar; *ok about Uiw^ x . . .
 v-« 
LM/iu), .mil ill • » ;=e iiau u^d drugs there was a distinct color to 
Uniciciil froiii when someone hasn't slept for n wink1. \V 
134/26-27). Irooper Jones also testified that this reddening of the eye HOI null I > 
lasts two to th ree hou rs, (R, 114f ""'" 1 1 1 1 Jo in i- 1 1 1 1 1 M ' » 1 1 1 i l l 1 • 111" (11; 11«, « <i»1 • 
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the Defendant. (R. 134/28). Trooper Jones asked the Defendant if he could see 
his tongue. The Defendant stuck his tongue out. (R. 134/29). Trooper Jones 
was looking for discoloration of the tongue. He testified that the Defendant's 
tongue "was kind of a greenish hue, a greenish tint to it." (R. 134/30). Trooper 
Jones believed that this was indicative of marijuana use. (R. 134/30). Trooper 
Jones also testified that there were large blisters on the Defendant's tongue and 
that they are "signs of someone who's been using something." (R. 134/31). 
Trooper Jones handcuffed the Defendant. (R. 134/35). The Defendant 
was placed in a patrol car that had the windows rolled up. Neusocksi was 
placed in Trooper Jones' vehicle which also had the windows rolled up. 
Trooper Jones testified that he saw them mouthing words at each other. "They 
seemed to be having some kind of conversation." (R. 134/36-37). Trooper 
Jones couldn't understand what either of them were allegedly saying. (R. 
134/37). When Trooper Jones got into his vehicle to transport the driver to jail 
the driver admitted that the items in the center console were his. (R. 134/35). 
Even though Neusocksi admitted to possessing the contraband, Trooper 
Jones decided to take the Defendant to jail because he believed that the 
Defendant was the one who was in possession of the contraband. (R. 134/38). 
Trooper Jones testified on cross-examination that he felt he had probable cause 
to arrest the Defendant because "I felt I had some signs and indicators that 
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indicated he had more recent use than four days prior." (R. 134/79). Trooper 
Jones testified that he thought the driver was covering for the Defendant when 
he confessed to possessing the marijuana that had been found in the center 
console. (R. 134/81). Even though Trooper Jones was arresting Defendant for 
possessing the marijuana and paraphernalia that was found in the center 
console, he cited the driver for DUI, possession of paraphernalia and 
possession of marijuana. (R. 134/81-82). When the Defendant arrived at the 
jail Trooper Jones searched him and found cocaine. (R. 134/38). 
The Defendant called two witnesses to testify on his behalf at the 
suppression hearing. The first was Dr. Bradley Richards who is an 
ophthalmologist. (R. 134/90). Dr. Richards testified that here are literally 
hundreds of different things that can cause a reddening of the conjuctiva, 
including chronic irritation to the eye, dry eyes, going for long periods without 
sleep, exposure to wind or dust. In addition, there are hundreds of medications 
and diseases that can cause reddening to the eyes. (R. 134/92). 
During the preliminary hearing, Trooper Jones had testified that the 
particular kind of reddening of the eye the Defendant exhibited was only 
caused by marijuana. (R. 134/92). Dr. Richards testified that there was not a 
type of conjunctival reddening that is specific to cannabis use. (R. 134/93-
100). 
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Dr. Keith Rothfedder who is a medical doctor specializing in emergency 
medicine also testified on behalf of the Defendant. (R. 134/105). Dr. 
Rothfeder testified with respect to reddened conjunctiva, there is nothing 
different about red eyes in patients who have smoked marijuana than red eyes 
that come from any other purpose. This is because the conjuctival vessels 
dilate that's what causes the reddening. (R. 134/112). He also testified that 
there wouldn't be a color change other than red because the only pigments to 
be seen are the red blood cells in the vessels. (R. 134/113). Dr. Rothfedder 
also testified that he had seen plenty of red eyes in patients who were under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol, but he had never seen a pigment to suggest a 
specific cause. (R. 134/113). 
Dr. Rothfeder was questioned concerning the green tongue. He testified 
that there wasn't anything he was aware of from a medical standpoint that 
would cause the tongue to turn green from smoking marijuana. (R. 134/114). 
Dr. Rothfeder has done thousands of physical examinations on patients who 
had smoked marijuana where he had examined the oral cavity and throat. He 
has never seen a green tongue caused by smoking marijuana. (R. 134/114). 
The trial court denied Defendant's motion. In its ruling from the bench, 
the court ruled that there was probable cause under the United Supreme Court's 
ruling in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). The trial court found that 
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there wasn't a scientific basis to allow evidence of the supposed green tongue. 
The trial court found that there was a denial on the part of the driver and the 
Defendant that the drugs were theirs. There wasn't an observation made that 
driver had used marijuana. The Defendant talked to the officers and admitted 
to prior drug use, including marijuana. The trial court found that there was 
reddening of the eye. The trial court acknowledged that it was 4:00 in the 
morning, that there could be allergies and a lot of other things that could cause 
the eyes to be red. The court didn't place any weight on the tongue. The Trial 
court found that since the drugs were in the car and both occupants of the 
vehicle denied ownership, that based on Maryland v. Pringle, the officer had 
probable cause to make the arrest. (R. 134/204-05). 
The court further found that there was no "vanishing probable cause." 
(R. 134/205). The court stated that "[i]n this case, the defendant was placed 
under arrest, was taken to a patrol car, . . . there's testimony that there was 
some communications between them and after the arrest of each one of them 
the driver then takes responsibility for those drugs. I think the arrest has been 
made. There is no vanishing probable cause at that point . . ." (R. 134/205). 
The prosecutor prepared Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that were 
signed by the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin. (R. 105-06). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Trooper Jones did not have probable cause to arrest the Defendant. The 
trial court's reliance on Maryland v. Pringle 540 U.S. 366 (2003) was 
misplaced. There are some important distinctions between the facts in Pringle 
and the facts in this case. Furthermore, even if the trooper initially had 
probable cause to arrest the Defendant, that probable cause dissipated when 
Neusocksi admitted that the marijuana and paraphernalia found in his car were 
his. 
ARGUMENT 
TROOPER JONES DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
CONTINUE THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST AFTER THE 
CAR'S OWNER ADMITTED THAT THE MARIJUANA AND 
PARAPHERNALIA FOUND IN THE CENTER CONSOLE 
WERE HIS. 
To justify a warrantless arrest under the Fourth Amendment, an officer 
must have probable cause "to believe that the suspect has committed or is 
committing an offense." State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185, 188 (Utah Ct. App. 
2004)(citations omitted). Probable cause determinations are reviewed under an 
"objective standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent 
person in his position would be justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense." State v. Cole, 61A P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983). 
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The United States Supreme Court has reiterated on many occasions that 
probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 
370 (2003)(quotations and citations omitted). Probable cause is "incapable of 
precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with 
probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 371. To 
determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual 
appellate courts should look at "the events leading up to the arrest, and then 
decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an 
objectively reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause." Id. (quoting 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). 
In Pringle, the defendant was one of three men riding in a vehicle that 
was stopped by police at 3:16 a.m. The defendant was seated in the front 
passenger seat. Seven hundred and sixty-three dollars ($763.00) in cash was 
rolled up in the glove compartment directly in front of the defendant. Five 
plastic baggies of cocaine were found behind the back-seat armrest and 
accessible to all three men. When they were questioned, all three of the 
occupants failed to offer any information with respect to ownership of the 
cocaine or the money. Id. at 371-72. 
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The Supreme Court found that under these facts, the officer had probable 
cause to arrest all three men. "We think it an entirely reasonable inference 
from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and 
exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus a reasonable officer 
could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle [defendant] 
committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly." Id. at 
372. 
The facts in the case at bar need to be analyzed under this backdrop 
since the trial court relied on Maryland v. Pringle, when it found that there was 
probable cause to arrest the Defendant. The facts the trial court relied on in 
finding probable cause are outlined in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (R. 105-07). They are: 
1. The driver of the vehicle displayed signs of alcohol impairment, 
but not drug use. 
2. The driver was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol. 
3. Trooper Jones searched the vehicle. The search yielded a 
marijuana pipe and a prescription bottle containing marijuana in 
the vehicle's center console. 
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The center console had a closed unlocked lid. The console was 
directly between the driver and passenger seat. 
The pipe and bottle of marijuana were located on top of items 
found in the center console. (This finding is clearly erroneous and 
was inconsistent with the Trooper's testimony. He testified that 
he didn't remember much being in the center console and he 
didn't remember having to dig for it.) (R. 134/22) 
Trooper Jones questioned both the driver and the Defendant, but 
neither claimed ownership of the contraband. Each persisted in 
the denial for approximately a half hour. (This finding is also 
clearly erroneous and inconsistent with the testimony from 
Trooper Jones. While he did testify that they both initially denied 
ownership, there was no evidence that this denial persisted or that 
they were questioned about it after the initial denial). 
When Trooper Jones questioned the Defendant he observed that 
Defendant showed signs of recent marijuana use—specifically 
reddened conjunctiva and a blistered tongue. 
The Court did not fund sufficient scientific proof to consider a 
greenish tinted tongue to be an indication of recent marijuana use. 
Trooper Jones is a certified Drug Recognition Expert. 
13 
10. Defendant admitted to using marijuana within the past four days, 
and using methamphetamine within the past twenty-four hours. 
11. The Defendant was arrested for Possession of Paraphernalia and 
Possession of Marijuana. 
12. The Defendant was arrested for Possession of Paraphernalia and 
Possession of Marijuana. 
13. The Defendant was placed in a patrol vehicle parked next to 
Trooper Jones' car. The driver was placed in Trooper Jones5 car. 
14. While the Defendant and the driver were in cars parked next to 
each other, they communicated by mouthing statements. Trooper 
Jones was not able to determine what the two were discussing. 
15. As soon as Trooper Jones got into his vehicle to transport the 
driver to jail, the driver said that the paraphernalia and drugs 
belonged to him. 
16. The Defendant was taken to jail where he was searched and 
cocaine was found in his underwear. 
Facts that were developed during the suppression hearing, but were not 
included in the Findings of Fact include that the driver was the owner of the 
vehicle, (R. 134/23), Trooper Jones didn't smell the odor of marijuana in the 
vehicle or on the Defendant, (R. 134/28, 73), the amount of marijuana found in 
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the car was "very small" (R. 134/19), it was dark outside (R. 134/27), the 
windows of the two police vehicles were rolled up, (R. 134/36), that Trooper 
Jones only looked for conjunctiva of the eye in the driver and when he didn't 
find that he didn't do any tests for poly-substance abuse, although the driver 
failed all four field sobriety tests. (R. 134/66-68). There was also testimony 
from Trooper Jones that there's a form provided to use in determining when 
someone is under the influence of drugs. (R. 134/69). Trooper Jones didn't use 
that form with the Defendant. (R. 134/69). He didn't check Defendant's vital 
signs or pulse, he didn't do a dark room examination, he didn't have the 
Defendant perform field sobriety tests and he didn't check for muscle tone. 
The only "tests" Trooper Jones did on the Defendant were he noticed the red 
eyes, the green tongue and blisters on the tongue. (R. 164/70). 
The fact Defendant's eyes were red and that he admitted smoking 
marijuana four days earlier and using methamphetamine within the last twenty-
four hours, standing alone, did not give Trooper Jones probable cause to arrest 
the Defendant, This is especially true in light of this Court's recent decision in 
State v. Ireland, 106 P.3d 753 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)(holding that consumption 
under U.C.A. §58-37-2(l)(dd) is a method of introducing a substance into the 
body), and State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
15 
The facts in this case are similar in many regards to State v. Hechtle, 89 
P.3d 185 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). In Hechtle, a Highway Patrol trooper initiated 
a traffic stop. As the trooper approached the vehicle the driver and front 
passenger lit cigarettes. The trooper also noticed tow or three air fresheners in 
the car. The driver was being overly helpful with complying the trooper's 
requests. The driver also had red eyes. They were 'Very red, very glassy" and 
"had a droop to them." Id. at 187. The trooper had the driver stick his tongue 
out. The trooper noted that the driver's tongue was "very green" with "blisters 
all over the back of it." Id. The trooper had the driver exit the vehicle so he 
could perform field sobriety tests. When the driver exited the vehicle, the 
trooper frisked him and discovered a marijuana pipe. The driver was arrested 
and admitted to smoking marijuana earlier in the day. Id. The trial court found 
that the trooper had probable cause to arrest the driver for driving with any 
measurable amount of controlled substance in his body. Id. at 188. Therefore, 
the "frisk" was a search incident to arrest. Id. 
This court found that under the circumstances, the trooper didn't have 
probable cause to arrest Hechtle for driving with a measurable amount of 
controlled substance in his body. This Court stated "assuming the trooper's 
suspicions of drug use may have been reasonable given the circumstances, he 
did nothing to confirm his suspicions. The trooper performed no field sobriety 
16 
tests and made no attempts to involve a certified DRE to validate his 
suspicions." Id. at 190. While Trooper Jones is a DRE, he didn't have 
Defendant perform any field sobriety tests, didn't smell marijuana on the 
Defendant or in the vehicle, and relied on Defendant's red eyes, and a green 
and blistered tongue. 
This Court stated "[although the presence of multiple air fresheners and 
other masking agents, as well as the condition of Hechtle's eyes, are certainly 
suggestive of possible drug use, they do not alone create probable cause. 
Furthermore, we are troubled by the trooper's reliance on the appearance of 
Hechtle's tongue as dispositive proof of marijuana use." Id. at 190-91. This 
Court found that the trooper had a "mere suspicion" that Hechtle had at some 
point in the past ingested marijuana that this was insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause. Id. at 191. 
Trooper Jones clearly did not have probable cause to arrest Defendant 
based on the red eyes and green tongue. Therefore, the probable cause to arrest 
the Defendant had to be for possessing the marijuana and paraphernalia that 
was found in the center console. The trial court's reliance on Maryland v. 
Pringle, is misplaced for two important reasons. First, there are some 
important differences between the facts in Pringle and the facts in the case at 
bar. In Pringle, the officers found a fairly large amount of cash in the glove 
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box in front of the defendant and a quantity of drugs that indicated the 
likelihood of drug dealing. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373. This was a 
factor the Supreme Court relied on. "The quantity of drugs and cash in the car 
indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would 
be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence 
against him." Id In the case at bar, Trooper Jones found what he called "a 
very small amount" of marijuana. (R. 134/19). 
There's a difference between a small user amount and what the Supreme 
Court called an "enterprise." That's because a drug dealer "would be unlikely 
to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against him." 
The small amount of marijuana found in Neusocksi's center console is 
certainly consistent with where a user would keep his personal stash. 
In Pringle, none of the three men provided information with respect to 
the ownership of the cocaine. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 374. In the 
case at bar, while both men initially denied ownership, the driver eventually 
admitted that both the marijuana and paraphernalia were his. 
The Supreme Court in Pringle cited to the case of United States v. Di Re, 
332 U.S. 581 (1948). In Di Re, the defendant was sitting in a car with two 
other men. A federal investigator had information from an informant that 
someone other than the defendant had counterfeit gasoline ration coupons. The 
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defendant was arrested and searched. The Court held that the officers didn't 
have probable cause to arrest the defendant because the officers didn't any 
information pointing to the defendant's possession of the counterfeit coupons. 
Id. at 592-94. "Any inference that everyone on the scene of a crime is a party 
to it must disappear if the Government informer singles out the guilty person." 
Id. at 594. In Pringle, the Court stated that there was probable cause because 
"[n]o such singling out occurred in this case; none of the three men provided 
information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or money." Maryland 
v. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 374. 
The facts in the case at bar are more like those in Di Re than they are to 
the facts in Pringle. There was a singling out when the owner of the vehicle 
admitted that the contraband was his. 
The second problem with relying on Pringle is that even if Trooper 
Jones initially had probable cause to arrest the Defendant, the probable cause 
dissipated when the driver admitted that the marijuana was his. If the driver 
would have initially admitted ownership, there would have been no probable 
cause to arrest the Defendant. Once the driver admitted that the items were his 
there was no longer probable cause to arrest the Defendant. This occurred 
before the Defendant was transported to the jail and searched. Therefore, the 
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evidence found during that search should have been suppressed as fruit of the 
poisonous tree. 
In his oral ruling, the trial judge indicated that Defendant's attorney had 
argued "a vanishing probable cause." (R. 134/205). Although the trial judge 
acknowledged that he had not looked at that law it made sense to him that 
"someone can pull on the scene, have probable cause and after some further 
investigation prior to arrest the probable cause may vanish." (R. 134/205). 
However, the court found that in this case, the defendant had already been 
placed under arrest, had been taken to a patrol car, had some communication 
with the driver and then the driver took responsibility for the drugs. The court 
stated "I think the arrest has been made. There is no vanishing probable cause 
at that point. . ." (R. 134/205). While the trial court was correct in 
acknowledging that probable cause can "vanish," the court apparently felt that 
this had to happen before a suspect was formally placed in custody. The 
court's ruling would be more logical if the Defendant had been searched prior 
to the dissipation of the probable cause. However, in this case, the Defendant 
was in handcuffs, but had not been searched or transported to the jail when 
Adam Neusocksi admitted that the marijuana was his. At this point when the 
probable cause dissipated, Defendant should have been released and sent on his 
way. 
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While the issue of dissipation of probable cause appears to be one of first 
impression in Utah, there is authority from other States and Federal District 
Courts to support this. In Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1988), the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[a]s a corollary, moreover, of the 
rule that the police may rely on the totality of facts available to them in 
establishing probable cause, they also may not disregard facts tending to 
dissipate probable cause." Id. at 1218. 
In Lowth v. Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563 (2nd Cir. 1996), the Court stated 
that, under New York law, "even when probable cause is present at the time of 
arrest, evidence could later surface which would eliminate that probable 
cause." Id. at 571 (Citations omitted). In order for probable cause to dissipate 
"the groundless nature of the charges must be made apparent by the discovery 
of some intervening fact." Id. 
In the case at bar, the probable cause dissipated when the driver and 
owner of the vehicle admitted that the marijuana and paraphernalia were his. 
Even though the Defendant had red eyes and had admitted to smoking 
marijuana in the past, this did not rise to the level of probable cause. There 
was no odor of marijuana on the Defendant and there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that the Defendant had possession or even constructive possession of 
the marijuana that was found in the vehicle. For these reasons, the evidence 
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that was found on his person as a search incident to arrest should have been 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Trooper Jones did not have probable cause to arrest the Defendant. The 
red eyes and green tongue did not give him probable cause to believe that the 
small amount of marijuana found in Neusocksi's center console were his. 
Even if Trooper Jones initially had probable cause to arrest the Defendant 
based on the denials, that probable cause dissipated when Neusocksi admitted 
that the contraband was his. At that point, the Defendant had not been 
transported to the jail and searched. He should have been released and sent on 
his way. Since the Defendant's arrest continued and the search was performed 
after Neusocksi admitted and was cited for possessing the marijuana, the 
evidence found during the search at the jail should have been suppressed. For 
these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
DATED this ^ d a y of July, 2005. 
-c ^°t-
DfeE W. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 1 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOE SUNTHIPHAB BOUPHA, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031903714 FS 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
Date: September 16, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbiel 
Prosecutor: RICHARD PARMLEY 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JIM RETALLICK, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 19, 1974 
Video 
Tape Number: BO91604 Tape Count: 10:16 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/05/2004 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in custody 
and is represented by Jim Retallick. Court proceeds with 
sentencing. Bailbond forfeited. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST 
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
Page 1 If. 9 
Case No: 031903714 
Date: Sep 16, 2004 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court recommends a concurrent sentence with case 041900894 with 
credit for time served in the Weber County Jail. 
Dated this J 4 _ day of > - ^ j 1 20jf>U_. ^ ^ ^ 
PAREEY R. BALDWIN 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM 2 
BRENDA J. BEATON, UBN 6832 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOE SUNTHIPHAB BOUPHA, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 031903714 
JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
This Court, having considered the motions, testimony and legal arguments, hereby denies 
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 22, 2003, Trooper Chris Jones of the Utah Highway Patrol ("Trooper Jones") 
stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding and excess window tinting. The vehicle was 
registered to Adam Nouansacksy ("Nouansacksy"). 
2. The driver of the vehicle, Nouansacksy, displayed signs of alcohol impairment, Trooper 
Jones had Nouansacksy perform field sobriety tests. 
3. Nouansacksy was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
4. Nouansacksy did not exhibit any physical signs of drug usage. 
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5. Trooper Jones searched Nouansacksy's vehicle. The search yielded a marijuana-pipe and 
a prescription bottle containing marijuana in the vehicle's center console. 
6. The pipe and bottle of marijuana were located on top of items found in the center console. 
7. The center console has a closed, unlocked lid. The console was directly between the 
driver and passenger seat. 
8. Trooper Jones questioned both Nouansacksy and the passenger, Defendant, but neither 
claimed ownership of the contraband. Each persisted in the denial for approximately a 
half hour. 
9. In questioning Defendant, Trooper Jones observed that Defendant showed signs of recent 
marijuana use-specifically reddened conjunctiva and a blistered tongue. 
10. This Court does not find sufficient scientific proof to consider a greenish tinted tongue to 
be an indication of recent marijuana use. 
11. Trooper Jones is a certified Drug Recognition Expert. 
12. Also, Defendant admitted to using marijuana within the past four days, and using 
methamphetamine within the past 24 hours. 
13. The Defendant was arrested for Possession of Paraphernalia and Possession of Marijuana. 
14. The Defendant was placed in a patrol vehicle parked next to Trooper Jones' car 
containing Nouansacksy handcuffed in the backseat. 
15. While the Defendant and Nouansacksy were parked next to each other, they were 
communicating with each other by mouthing statements. Trooper Jones was not able to 
determine what the two were discussing. 
16. As soon as Trooper Jones got in the driver's seat of his vehicle to take Nouansacksy to 
the jail, Nouansacksy said the paraphernalia and drugs belong to him. 
ICG 
17. Trooper Jones did not change his mind about arresting the Defendant. 
18. The Defendant was taken to the jail. While there, he was searched and a large quantity of 
cocaine was found in his underwear. 
19. The Defendant never requested to leave the scene while Trooper Jones was conducting 
his DUI investigation on Nouansacksy. 
20. The Defendant was never ordered to remain at the scene during the parallel investigation. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial stop was justified because Trooper Jones observed traffic violations. 
2. The Defendant was not illegally detained. 
3. Trooper Jones had sufficient probable cause to arrest the Defendant. Pursuant to 
Maryland v. Pringle, the officer was justified in making the arrest given the denial by all 
parties in the car. 
4. Trooper Jones' probable cause determination does not evaporate the minute Nouansacksy 
admits to ownership of the pipe and marijuana. 
5. Trooper Jones' had sufficient facts absent the denial to make a probable cause 
arrest-admission of use, proximity to the contraband and physical indications of use. 
6. A reasonable police office in Trooper Jones' position would have arrested the Defendant. 
7. Given the totality of all the facts and circumstances, the officer acted properly in arresting 
the Defendant. 
Dated this J_L d ay of «Wj(, 2004. 
yftiL^lu i 
JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
Second Judicial District Court 
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Approved as to form: 
BRENDA J. BEATON 
Deputy Weber Cminty Attorney 
Q/io/o^ 
JAMES RETALLICK 
Attorney for Defendant 
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A Adam Neusocksi, I think that's how you say it. 
Q What was the reason that you stopped this car? 
A Speeding and a window tint violation. 
Q And how fast are we talking about? 
A I can give you the actual speed in here. Forty in a 
30 and the window tint was at 12.8%. The legal limit is 43. 
Q 43? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q When you stopped this particular car did you, are you 
familiar with the defendant in this case? 
A I am. 
Q All right. How do you know the defendant? 
A I went to high school with him. 
Q Okay. Have you had any dealings with the defendant 
in terms of your job as a Utah Highway Patrol officer? 
A Not until this incident. 
Q Okay. So did you recognize the Defendant initially 
as being somebody you had gone to high school with, or did you 
develop that information later? 
A No, I recognized him immediately. 
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1 A The driver was orig, the driver smelled of alcohol, 
2 of an alcoholic beverage. The driver went through field 
3 sobriety test, failed the field sobriety test and was arrested 
4 for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
5 Q Okay. Let's talk specifically because we're, I'm not 
6 really that interested in that driver, other than let me ask 
7 you this, did that driver have any particular signs that you 
8 saw, either by admissions or observations that the driver was 
9 at all involved in any kind of illegal drug usage? 
10 A No, all his signs and symptoms indicated alcohol. 
11 Q While you're performing - I assume you performed 
12 field sobriety tests on the driver? 
13 A I did. 
14 Q Okay, about how long would you anticipate that you're 
15 dealing with the driver? 
16 A Probably 10, 15, maybe even 20 minutes. 
17 Q Okay, do you have your DUI report here? 
18 A I do. 
19 Q Okay, and on the DUI report do you have some 
20 indication of what time you start dealing with the driver and 
21 then what time you end up taking the driver down to the jail to 
22 give a breath, Breathalyzer examination? 
23 A My - 20, I'm sorry, I better find the right page. It 
24 looks like the traffic stop was at 4:20 and the Breathalyzer 
25 test was -
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1 you felt that you needed backup? Did he ever do anything to 
2 cause you any concerns? 
3 A Well no, there's, there's an indication that 
4 sometimes passengers will get involved and can cause trouble. 
5 In this case he just sat there. 
6 Q Okay. When those other two officers arrived on the 
7 scene did they do anything, for example, like stand next to the 
8 passenger door to prevent the defendant from leaving? 
9 A No. 
10 Q Where did they stand? 
11 A Close to me and my field sobriety test. 
12 Q Okay. Because that's the primary concern? 
13 A That's the focus. 
14 Q All right. Let's talk about then after you arrest 
15 the driver. After you arrest the driver, did you do some kind 
16 of search of the car? 
17 A I did. 
18 Q Why did you do that? 
19 A We call it search into it, incident to arrest. 
20 Q Okay, and was the car itself owned by the person who 
21 is the driver? 
22 A I believe so, yes. 
23 Q All right, and which portion of the car then did you 
24 search? 
25 A The passenger compartment. 
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1 Q And did you conduct the search yourself? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q All right, and in searching the passenger 
4 compartment, did you find anything unusual? 
5 A I did. 
6 Q What did you find? 
7 A I found a marijuana pipe and a small, I believe it 
8 was a prescription bottle containing some marijuana. 
9 Q Okay. About how much marijuana was it that was in 
10 this prescription bottle? 
11 A I didn't list an amount, but I'm sure the crime lab 
12 did. If I can find that report. If you'll just bear with me 
13 for a moment. I got a lot of papers here. If you have a copy 
14 of it, that'd be great *cause I'm not sure if I do or not. I 
15 don't always get them back. 
16 Q Well, why don't you just give us an estimate. I mean 
17 is this, you know, approximately how many grams would you 
18 estimate? 
19 A Oh, it was a very small amount. 
20 Q Okay. 
21 A Just a few leaves. 
22 Q Just a few leaves? 
23 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
24 Q Okay, so it's going to be like a gram or less then? 
25 A Probably. 
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1 smelled like marijuana. 
2 Q Okayf and did it look like marijuana? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q And have you dealt with marijuana in the past? 
5 A Repeatedly. 
6 Q How many times would you estimate you've dealt with 
7 marijuana? 
8 A Oh, I've got probably several hundred drug arrests. 
9 Q All right. Where was this paraphernalia located, the 
10 pipe and the bag of marijuana? 
11 A It's in -
12 Q It's not a bag, the container of marijuana. 
13 A In the center console between the driver and 
14 passenger seat. 
15 Q Okay, what type of car is this? 
16 A It was a Nissan Maxima. Nice one. 
17 Q But it's a sedan of some sort. 
18 A Four-door sedan. 
19 Q [inaudible] And when you say it's in the center 
20 console, what kind of console does this Nissan Maxima have? 
21 A Well you've got the two bucket seats in the front 
22 seat and it's divided by a center console that has some kind of 
23 closing, the arm rest closes over it, or whatever you say, and 
24 so it's directly between the driver and the passenger seat. 
25 Q And does the, you know, sometimes those arm rests 
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1 Q Okay, so that's what you're planning on doing? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q All right. The paraphernalia, when you see it in the 
4 interior area, is the defendant still in the car at this point 
5 in time where you're doing the search incident to arrest in the 
6 car? 
7 A No. 
8 Q Where's the defendant then? 
9 A Standing outside with the other two officers. 
10 Q Okay, is he in handcuffs at that point? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Okay, is he suspected of being at all involved in 
13 this DUI alcohol at this point? 
14 A No. 
15 Q When you see the paraphernalia and the drugs inside 
16 the prescription bottle, what do you do? 
17 A First of all I take it and put it in my car where I 
18 can secure it as evidence and then I begin asking the driver 
19 and the passenger who owns it. 
20 Q Okay, do you start with the driver since the driver's 
21 already under arrest? 
22 A I can't remember if I started with the driver or the 
23 passenger. I know I questioned both of them though. 
24 Q Okay, but you don't know which order? 
25 A I can't remember which one I did first. 
24 
1 Q And initially when you talk to both of these 
2 individuals about who maybe owns it or who's been using this 
3 stuff, does anybody admits to you there the ownership or the 
4 use? 
5 A No. Well Mr. Boupha admitted to using marijuana 
6 within the, I think he said four days prior to the incident and 
7 methamphetamines within 24 hours. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 A But not that particular day. 
10 Q Okay. Did the driver make any admissions? 
11 A No. 
12 Q [inaudible] 
13 A No, none at all. 
14 Q So at the time that you're doing this then do you 
15 have a conversation first, then do you get the admission from 
16 the defendant that he's used within the last few days first or 
17 do you actually make visual signs, look at the defendant first? 
18 A They're done at the same time. 
19 Q Okay. 
20 A During the, during my talk with him now that, you 
21 know, I'm heightened that there's more here to look for, you 
22 deal with people who are under the influence of a lot of things 
23 all the time, but you've got to have reasons to go farther with 
24 it. 
25 Q So while you're talking to him, what do you see about 
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1 the defendant that causes you concern? 
2 A I notice one thing that he's got a reddening of the 
3 conjunctiva, which is what I've been taught is a symbol or a 
4 sign of someone who's using marijuana. 
5 Q What does reddening of the conjunctiva mean? 
6 A Well it's kind of a, it's a thing with the eyes where 
7 they kind of get a reddish, the way I've been taught it's a 
8 reddish, brownish look about them and from what I read in my 
9 DRE book they give marijuana to glaucoma patients to release or 
10 change the pressure in the eye and I assume that's what causes 
11 it. 
12 Q Where do you look, for example? Since we haven't 
13 looked for this in somebody else's eyes, what do you look for? 
14 I understand reddening, but reddening where? 
15 A In the eye, in the white part of the eye. 
16 Q In the white portion? In all of the white portion of 
17 the eye or a certain location of the eye? 
18 A All of it. 
19 Q And how do you distinguish this from just somebody 
20 who's got bloodshot eyes or, you know, they haven't slept for a 
21 few hours? 
22 A Well like I said, it's a different color. It's hard 
23 to describe, but it's a different color. A person that's got 
24 blood shot eyes, their eyes may be white, but they've got, you 
25 know, you can see the veins inside the eye. This kind of 
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1 turns, turns it a different color. 
2 Q Okay. It's dark out at the time. How are you able 
3 to see this in the defendant's eyes? 
4 A We've got a flashlight. I've got a spot light on my 
5 car, headlights on the car and overhead take down lights on my 
6 car. 
7 Q Okay, so the area is well lit then when you're 
8 looking at the defendant? 
9 A That's correct. 
10 Q Okay. And is there degrees of redness that you look 
11 for? 
12 A I'm not that good. So just whether it's there or 
13 whether it's not. That's all I look for. 
14 Q Okay, so when the defendant says I used marijuana a 
15 few days ago, but his eyes are red, do you suspect that, that 
16 he might have recent use? 
17 A I'll guarantee he had recent use. 
18 Q Well, okay. 
19 A Sorry. 
20 Q Let's not go there. I mean did he say that he had 
21 recent use? 
22 A He said within four days. 
23 Q All right. Is, is this reddening, does it last for 
24 four days? 
25 A No. 
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1 Q How long does it normally last? 
2 A Two to three hours. On a few, on a few people it can 
3 last up to three or four, maybe even six hours is the maximum, 
4 from what I understand• 
5 Q When you're standing next to the defendant do you 
6 smell any indication on him that he's been using marijuana? 
7 A No, when it was standing up wind. 
8 Q You were standing up wind? 
9 A Yeah, we were standing in the North Ogden Pass. So 
10 the wind's coming down from the pass. 
11 Q Was it windy that night? 
12 A I don't remember anything great. But I didn't smell 
13 anything either. 
14 Q Okay. You'd indicated earlier that you smelled 
15 alcohol on the driver. How were you able to do that if you 
16 were standing up wind from where this is taking place? 
17 A Well, he's inside of a vehicle, which kind of traps 
18 the scent and while they're looking for things you just, if you 
19 can't, if you see some of the signs of someone who's using 
20 alcohol, you know, blood shot eyes and stuff like that, slurred 
21 speech, things like that, then you lean over, smell the car. 
22 Once they get out of the car you maneuver around so you can 
23 smell if it's coming from them or not. 
24 Q So is it the first, when you first make an 
25 I observation about the defendant or when he first starts 
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1 becoming a suspect in a potential crime, is he inside the car 
2 or outside of the car? 
3 A He's outside. 
4 Q All right. Did you ever walk over to the passenger 
5 side before you dealt with the driver and field sobriety tests 
6 and all that other stuff you were doing with the driver? 
7 A No, I did everything from the driver's side. 
8 Q Okay, so you didn't make any observations of the 
9 defendant while in the car? 
10 A No. 
11 Q All right. So in addition to this reddening of the 
12 eye, what else do you see? 
13 A Oh, I asked him if I could look at his tongue. 
14 Q Did he open his mouth? 
15 A He did. 
16 Q Did he agree to let you do that? 
17 A He stuck his tongue out. 
18 Q All right, he stuck his tongue out in response to 
19 "can I look at the inside of your mouth?" 
20 A Can I look at your tongue? 
21 Q Did he say yes or no? 
22 A He said sure. 
23 Q Okay. 
24 A He just stuck his tongue out. 
25 Q He said sure and sticks his tongue out? 
1 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
2 Q And what are you looking for when you ask somebody to 
3 look at their tongue? 
4 A Discoloration of the tongue, maybe blisters on the 
5 back of the tongue. 
6 Q Okay. And did you see any discoloration? 
7 A I did. 
8 Q What color? 
9 A It was kind of a greenish hue, a greenish tint to it. 
10 Q And have you seen this kind of hue before? 
11 A I have. 
12 Q And what do you believe that to be indicative of? 
13 A Marijuana usage. 
14 Q All right. Did you also look at the bottom of his 
15 tongue? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Did you, when you were looking at the top of his 
18 tongue, did you notice anything unusual about the tongue 
19 itself? 
20 A Other than the blisters in the back, no. 
21 Q Okay, when you say there were blisters in the back, 
22 where is the back then of the tongue? 
23 A Say you stick your tongue out like you do at the 
24 doctor, ahh, so you can see the back of the tongue where it 
25 comes into the throat, where the hot gases have to go in to be 
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1 inhaled. 
2 Q Okay, so the back of the tongue doesn't mean the 
3 underside of the tongue, it means the back of the mouth area? 
4 A Yeah, at the top of the tongue in the back of the 
5 mouth in the throat. 
6 Q Okay, and how are you able to see into the back of 
7 his throat area? 
8 A I have a flashlight. 
9 Q All right, and when you say that there were blisters, 
10 what do they look like? 
11 A Just large blisters on the back of the tongue. I 
12 know most people's tongues are somewhat smooth. They might 
13 have some indents and stuff like that. These were some large 
14 blisters. 
15 Q Okay, so when you say that the blisters are on the 
16 tongue, are they connected to the interior of the tongue, or 
17 are they on the interior portion of the defendant's mouth? 
18 A Just on the back of the tongue, that's all I saw. 
19 Q Okay, on the tongue but in the back area of the 
20 tongue near the throat area? 
21 A That's correct. 
22 Q Okay. I mean, do you calculate, you know, do you add 
23 those up? 
24 A There's no specific formula for it. These are just 
25 I signs of someone who's been using something. 
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what's in the center console? 
A Half an hour. 
Q Okay, so for half an hour they both stick with not 
mine, not using? 
A Well that's, yeah, more than that actually. 
Q Okay. 
A Because the admission by Mr. Neusocksi was only just 
before we left for the jail. 
Q Okay. So by the time that you're ready to leave for 
jail, have you placed any kind of handcuffs on the defendant? 
A I have. 
Q All right. When would - let me back up one more 
step. When does the driver, when does he start talking about, 
okay, that stuff in the center console is mine? 
A When I got in the car to drive him to the jail. 
Q Okay. That's the first time you hear any admission 
from him? 
A That's correct. 
Q All right, and is there any follow-up conversation 
with him where he indicates some kind of concern for this 
defendant? 
A I don't remember anything. 
Q Okay. Trooper Jones, there's, there's 
i ways. I mean does he just sort of spit out that 
paraphernalia and the drugs found in the car are 
different 
the 
his, or is it 
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1 in sort of a, well let's not - how did he say it? 
2 A He just spit it out. 
3 Q Okay. And as a result of him spitting out, where's 
4 the defendant at, at the time that you're driving the driver to 
5 the jail? 
6 A In the patrol car that was parked next to us. 
7 Q Okay. So he's in handcuffs, this defendant, and 
8 you've got the driver in handcuffs and where is he at in the 
9 car? 
10 A The driver's in my car in the back seat in a cage. 
11 Q Okay. 
12 A The other patrol car is parked directly next to my 
13 patrol car on the right side and he's, Mr. Boupha, is in the 
14 back seat of that car in a cage with handcuffs on. 
15 Q Okay, are the windows rolled up, or are the windows 
16 rolled down? 
17 A Windows are rolled up. 
18 Q Do you know whether or not the driver and the 
19 defendant were communicating in any fashion? 
20 A They were. 
21 Q How do you know they were communicating? 
22 A I saw them. 
23 Q What were they doing? 
24 A You could see them mouthing words at, they were 
25 pointing, their faces were pointed at each other. They seemed 
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1 to be having some kind of conversation. 
2 Q So they're mouthing words to each other, can you read 
3 either of their lips to understand what either one of them are 
4 saying? 
5 A I couldn't understand what they were saying. 
6 Q How long do you leave them in this condition where 
7 they're mouthing words to each other? 
8 A I didn't time it and there was nothing, I mean there 
9 was nothing I could do to stop it. 
10 Q About how long are you driving in the car until the 
11 defendant that you're with, the driver, admits the stuff in the 
12 console was his? 
13 A As we got, as I got into the car to drive him to the 
14 jail, that's when he said it. 
15 Q At that point had he had any other conversation with 
16 you when you get into the car? 
17 A Not about the drugs, no. Not, not about owning the 
18 drugs I should say. 
19 Q Well, no, my question is, in terms of, you know, you 
20 know, I imagine that when somebody is sitting in the back cage 
21 they've got a lot of things to say, maybe when you get in the 
22 car to drive them to the jail. You know, maybe they're mad, 
23 you know, maybe they're crying, maybe they're whatever, is the 
24 first topic of conversation with the driver, "Hey, I'm 
25 responsible for that stuff in the car"? 
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A 
Q 
going to 
A 
Q 
When I got in to take him to jail, yeah, it was. 
So there wasn't any, you know, "Hey, man you're not 
take me to jail, are ya?" 
No. 
There's no other conversation other than the 
confession immediately? 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
All right. And at the time that the driver makes 
this confession to you, does that change your mind as to 
whether 
for the 
A 
Q 
A 
or not you're going to arrest this defendant as well 
possession? 
No. 
Why? 
Because I believed he was the one who was in 
possession of it. 
Q Okay. And you believed you had probable cause at 
that point? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
found on 
A 
Yes. 
All right, and then did you take him to the jail? 
I did. 
And was he subsequently searched and cocaine was 
i him? 
He was. 
24 
25 
Q All right. And we don't really need to get as much 
into that. Let's now talk about what kind of training you have 
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1 A Yup. 
2 Q Where does it say greenish tinge to the tongue in 
3 that section? 
4 A Well, the way you've asked me to classify it, it says 
5 marijuana debris in the mouth. Third one down, marked 
6 reddening of the conjunctiva, odor of marijuana, marijuana 
7 debris in the mouth, body tremors, eyelid tremors, relaxed 
8 inhibitions, increased appetite, impaired possession -
9 perception of time and distance, disorientation, possible 
10 paranoia. 
11 Q But nowhere in the manual does it ever mention 
12 coloring of the tongue, correct? 
13 A It never describes what marijuana debris in the mouth 
14 is. It's subject to interpretation. Now the way my class was 
15 taught by my instructors, greenish tinge, the way you're asking 
16 me to classify it is debris in the mouth. 
17 Q I know there's something more in here, and I've got 
18 to find it. I'll find it in a bit. Let's continue. Now you've 
19 stated that the driver had no signs or symptoms for marijuana; 
20 is that correct? 
21 A I didn't see any. 
22 Q Did you look for any? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q What did you look for? 
25 A Reddening of the conjunctiva of the eye. 
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1 A No, I 
2 Q You never checked the vital signs or pulse? 
3 A No. 
4 Q You didn't do a dark room examination? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Okay. You didn't check for muscle tone, you've 
7 already testified to. Basically, the only thing you did was go 
8 on the eyes and what you perceive as a greenish tinge on the 
9 tongue. Now did you ask Mr. Boupha if he was taking any 
10 medications? 
11 A I asked if he was using any drugs. 
12 Q Well, when a cop asks somebody are you using any 
13 drugs, most people will assume you're talking about illegal 
14 substances, correct? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Oh, everybody's going to come and my wife will tell 
17 you about the estrogen she takes or this depressant or that, or 
18 I'm going -
19 A I don't know what your wife's going to tell me. I've 
20 never pulled her over. 
21 Q So, so people are, so, so people just volunteer the 
22 full pharmacy of medications that they're taking when you ask 
23 them if they're taking any drugs? 
24 A Very often they do. 
25 J Q All right. Especially when you're arresting the 
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